Inclusion criteria describe evidence that can establish this activity. Exclusion criteria identify circumstances that do not establish it on that basis alone. The evaluation remains connected to its taxonomy version and supporting evidence.
Included when supported
Evidence may support involvement when it matches one or more of these inclusion criteria.
- 01Criterion
Transfer of Title, Ownership, Custody, or Control
Defined as: Entities that knowingly cause, arrange, or control a change in title, ownership, custody, or control of operational anti-personnel mines between parties. Physical movement is not required when title or control changes.
- 02Criterion
Contractual Transfers Within Broader Weapons Packages
Defined as: Entities that broker, fulfil, or administer a contract that expressly changes title, ownership, custody, or control of anti-personnel mines as part of a wider weapons package.
- 03Criterion
Arms Dealers or Brokers With Transfer Authority
Defined as: Entities authorized to negotiate or execute a change in title, ownership, custody, or control of operational anti-personnel mines, even when they neither manufacture nor physically transport the mines.
- 04Criterion
Corroborated Transfer Evidence From Authoritative Investigations
Defined as: Entities for which an NGO, treaty monitor, UN body, government record, sanctions or enforcement record, or other authoritative investigation provides an exact legal-entity, product, transfer, and time attribution concerning treaty-defined anti-personnel mines, and the assertion is corroborated by a primary source or another independent authoritative source. List membership or a combined controversial-weapons list alone is insufficient.
- 05Criterion
State-to-State or Other Non-Commercial Transfers
Defined as: Entities that execute, administer, or facilitate a documented handoff or change in title, custody, or control of operational anti-personnel mines between governments, armed forces, or other parties without requiring a commercial sale.
- 06Criterion
Operational Handover With Custody or Control Transition
Defined as: Private military, logistics, or other contractors that knowingly execute an operational handover in which custody or control of anti-personnel mines passes to a recipient. Physical carriage without such a transition is transportation, not transfer.
Excluded on this basis alone
These circumstances do not establish this activity unless separate evidence also meets an inclusion criterion.
- 01Criterion
Transfer of Anti-Vehicle or Command-Only Devices Without a Victim-Activated Mode
Defined as: Entities that transfer only anti-vehicle mines or command-detonated explosive devices that require deliberate human activation and have no available mode triggered by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Sensor technology, remote delivery, self-destruction, self-neutralization, or self-deactivation does not by itself place a victim-activated mine outside the treaty definition.
- 02Criterion
Logistics Companies Without Control Over the Transfer
Defined as: Transport firms, customs brokers, or freight providers with no role in ownership, intent, or end-use decisions.
- 03Criterion
Deactivated or Inert Mine Transfers
Defined as: Organizations transferring training or display versions of anti-personnel mines that are non-functional and fully demilitarized.
- 04Criterion
Transfers Related to Humanitarian Clearance Programs
Defined as: Entities moving anti-personnel mines for destruction or research under humanitarian oversight or disarmament frameworks.
- 05Criterion
Historical-Only Transfer
Defined as: Entities with verified past transfer or brokerage of operational anti-personnel mines or the applicable outside-definition devices, where reliable evidence establishes that the qualifying activity has fully ceased, been divested, transferred, dismantled, terminated, or otherwise ended and no current qualifying involvement remains. Historical-only activity does not qualify as current involvement. Preserve the historical record separately with the activity period, effective cessation or transfer date, relevant entity, product, programme, facility, or contract, and supporting evidence. Absence of recent evidence alone is not sufficient to establish cessation.
- 06Criterion
Transfer of Components Without Assembly or Deployment
Defined as: Firms transferring parts (e.g., fuzes, shells) with no confirmed integration into anti-personnel mine systems or final weaponization.
Evidence and evaluation methodology
How sources, entity pathways, decisions, qualifiers, and review history are handled.
Map screens to a client policy
How to choose provider screens, document coverage, and decide what happens after an outcome.
Other screens under Anti-Personnel Mines (Treaty Definition)
Anti-Personnel Mines Production
6 included · 7 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Import
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Export
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Transportation
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Development
7 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Assembly
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Repair
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Stockpiling, Storage, Possession and Retention
5 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Use
7 included · 5 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Promotion
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Sale
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Distribution
6 included · 6 excluded
Anti-Personnel Mines Acquisition and Procurement
6 included · 6 excluded